Papers

(See Publications for the published papers, and CV for the complete list.)

Public Disagreement
(with Rajiv Sethi)

Nash meets Rubinstein in final offer arbitration

Investor Sentiments
(with Sergei Izmalkov)
Forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
(with Jonathan Weinstein)

Fragility of Asymptotic Agrreement under Bayesian Learning
(with Daron Acemoglu and Victor Chernozhukov)

Durable Bargaining Power and Stochastic Deadlines
(with Alp Simsek)

Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World
(with Daron Acemoglu and Victor Chernozhukov)

Generic uniqueness of rationalizable actions
Most results have been published in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007): "A structure theorem for rationalizability...", Econometrica.

Finite-order Implications of Any Equilibrium [Substantially revised]
(with Jonathan Weinstein)
Most results have been published in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007): "A structure theorem for rationalizability...", Econometrica.

Optimism, deadline effect, and stochastic deadlines
Obsolete: incorporated into "Durability of bargaining power and stochastic deadlines" by Simsek and Yildiz

Sequential bargaining without a common prior on the recognition process
Muhamet Yildiz