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Curriculum Vitae

- Personal Data** Date of birth: 26 December 1972,
Citizenship: Russian Federation
- Current Position** Assistant Professor, from July 2002,
[Department of Economics, MIT](#)
- Education** 2002, Ph.D. in Economics,
[The Pennsylvania State University](#)
Thesis: [Essays on Auctions and Efficiency](#)
Advisor: [Vijay Krishna](#)
- 1997, M.A. (cum laude) in Economics,
[New Economic School, Moscow, Russia](#)
- 1994, Diploma (cum laude) in Mathematics,
[Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia](#),
(5 year degree with thesis, \approx M.S.)
- Awards** NSF: SES-0551244
Title: "Cryptographic Game Theory"
Anticipated total: \$274,272
- Publications** [Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design](#),
joint with Matt Lepinski and Silvio Micali,
in *Proceedings of the 46th Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, IEEE, pp. 585-594, Oct 2005*
- [Verifiably Secure Devices](#),
joint with Matt Lepinski and Silvio Micali,
to appear in *Proceedings of the 5th Theory of Cryptography
Conference, IACR, March 2008*

[The theory of economic mechanisms \(Nobel Prize in Economics, 2007\)](#), in Russian (not refereed),
joint with Konstantin Sonin and Maria Yudkevich,
in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, Vol. 1, pp. 4-26, January 2008
(Теория экономических механизмов (Нобелевская премия по экономике 2007 г.), "Вопросы экономики", № 1, стр. 4-26, 2008)

Working papers

[Perfect Implementation of Normal-Form Mechanisms](#),
joint with Matt Lepinski and Silvio Micali

[Investor Sentiments](#),
joint with Muhamet Yildiz

[On Efficiency of the English auction](#),
joint with Oleksii Birulin

[English Auctions with Reentry](#)

[Multi-unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction](#)

[Shill-bidding and Optimal Auctions](#)

A Model of an English Auction with Jump-Bidding

Pure Equilibria and the Achievement of Correlated Equilibrium,
joint with Matt Lepinski, Silvio Micali, and Abhi Shelat

[Transparent Computation and Correlated Equilibrium](#),
joint with Matt Lepinski, Silvio Micali, and Abhi Shelat

Non-existence of Conventional (Partially Monotone) Equilibria in
Simultaneous Lowest-Bid Procurement Auctions,
joint with Elena Krasnokutskaya

A Model of Optimal Ticket Pricing with Heterogeneous Quality and
Heterogeneous Customers,
joint with Johnatan Nauer

Teaching

Topics in Game Theory (14.147), MIT, Spring 2003 (jointly with Muhamet Yildiz); Spring 2004 (jointly with Drew Fudenberg),

Advanced Game Theory (14.126), MIT, Fall 2002 (jointly with Muhamet Yildiz); Fall 2003 (jointly with Drew Fudenberg),

Intermediate Micro (14.04), MIT, Fall 2002 - Fall 2006,

Topics in Contract Theory (14.129), MIT, Spring 2004 - Spring 2007,

Introductory Econometrics (ECON 490), PSU, Summer 2000.

Professional Activities

Instructor's Assistant for Panel Data Analysis and Applied Econometric Time Series Analysis methodological seminars, The Economics Education and Research Consortium (EERC), Moscow, Russia, May 1998, Nov 1999.

Referee: Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Systems, Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, European Economic Review, International Economic Review, Routledge Economics Books, American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Mathematics of Operations Research.

Program Committee: The Theoretical and Applied Economics Program Committee for the 59th European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Madrid, August 2004.