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MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER

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MIT PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR

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**DOCTORAL
STUDIES**

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2009
DISSERTATION: "Social Networks in Industrial Organization"

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES

Professor Glenn Ellison
MIT Department of Economics
50 Memorial Drive, E52-380A
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Professor Muhamet Yildiz
MIT Department of Economics
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Professor Michael Greenstone
MIT Department of Economics
50 Memorial Drive, E52-359
Cambridge, MA 02142-1347
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**PRIOR
EDUCATION**

BA in Mechanical Engineering, 1st Class Honours, University of Melbourne, 2002
BA in Economics, 1st Class Honours, University of Melbourne, 2002

CITIZENSHIP

Australia, Ireland

GENDER Male

DATE OF BIRTH 2/25/1978

**RESEARCH &
TEACHING
FIELDS**

Industrial Organization, Energy/Environmental Economics, Theory,

TEACHING EXPERIENCE Instructor - Energy Economics and Policy (Undergraduate/Graduate, MIT course 14.44/444), 2008

Teaching assistant to Nancy Rose and Paul Joskow - Industrial Organization II (Graduate, MIT course 14.272), 2007, 2008

Teaching assistant to Paul Joskow- Energy Economics and Policy (Undergraduate, MIT course 14.44/444), 2007

Teaching assistant to Tom Stoker - Microeconomics (MBA, MIT course 15.024), 2007

RELEVANT POSITIONS Research Assistant to Professor Glenn Ellison, Summer 2006
Research Assistant to Professor Paul Joskow, Fall 2006

INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE Consultant, Frontier Economics, 2003-2004

ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES & AWARDS Conference presentation UCEI Electricity Camp 2008
Finch International Fellowship, 2004-2006
Top Student in Economics and Commerce, University of Melbourne, 2002

PUBLICATIONS **“Solutions Manual to Accompany Contract Theory”** (with Moshe Cohen, Florian Ederer and Johannes Spinnewijn) *MIT Press*, September 2007.

RESEARCH PAPERS **“Tell your Friends! Word of Mouth and Percolation in Social Networks” (Job Market Paper)**
This paper studies the optimal pricing and advertising strategies of a monopolist selling a good to consumers who may spread news about the good to uninformed consumers. I study this in a percolation model of word of mouth communication in a social network. In comparison to a standard monopoly model: (i) Demand is more elastic in the presence of word of mouth communication, inducing a downward bias in naive estimates of consumers' valuation for the good; (ii) The monopolist fluctuates the price to optimally diffuse information through the population; and (iii) Advertising for exclusive (high cost) products should target consumers with many friends and advertising for common (low cost) products should target consumers with relatively fewer friends.

“Hot Air? When can Subsidies for Wind Generation Increase Emissions?”
This paper analyzes the effects of subsidies for wind technology on long-run incentives for investment in non-renewable electricity generation technologies. I find conditions under which supporting wind may, in fact, increase carbon emissions. The interaction between the intermittency of wind and variability of electricity demand may lead to investment substitution away from baseload generating technologies towards peaking and intermediate technologies in the long run. If peaking and intermediate technologies are more carbon intensive than non-renewable "baseload" technologies, this substitution can more than offset the emission benefits derived from the output of the renewable technology.

“Signaling in Social Networks”

In this paper I show how a relatively simple intuition, that people trust each other more when they share a friend in common, can lead to a process of network formation similar to that of Jackson and Rogers (2007) as a sequential equilibrium of a dynamic game. This provides a microeconomic foundation for network formation allowing one to predict when different types of networks are likely to form based on model parameters and to analyze the welfare implications of these networks. Furthermore, it provides a framework within which the effects of broad based policies designed to affect social networks can be assessed.