

# Muhamet Yildiz

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## Education

*STANFORD UNIVERSITY, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, Stanford, California*

Ph.D. in Economic Analysis and Policy, 2000.

**Dissertation Title:** Essays on sequential bargaining.

**Principal Advisor:** Robert Wilson.

*BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY, Istanbul, Turkey*

M.A. in Economics, 1994; B.Sc. in EE, 1992; and B.Sc. in Mathematics, 1992.

## Academic Positions

*MIT ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, Cambridge, Massachusetts*

Professor, 2009-present

Associate Professor, 2006-2009

Assistant Professor, 2000-2006

*YALE UNIVERSITY, ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT AND COWLES FOUNDATION,*

*New Haven, Connecticut*

Visiting Assistant Professor, 2003-2004

## Awards and Honors

Institute for Advanced Study Member, 2008-2009

Alfred Sloan Research Fellow, 2006-2008

Pentti J.K. Kouri Career Development Chair, 2005-2008

Cowles Foundation Fellow, 2003-2004

## Publications

1. "Investor Sentiments," (with Sergei Izmalkov), *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, forthcoming.

2. "Moderation of an ideological party," (with Vlasta Pokladnikova), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 65, 516-537, 2009.
3. "A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements" (with Jonathan Weinstein), *Econometrica*, 75(2), 365-400, 2007.
4. "Wishful thinking in strategic environments," *Review of Economic Studies*, 74 (1), 319-344, 2007.
5. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty" (with Jonathan Weinstein), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 60(1), 200-212, 2007.
6. "The impact of prior decisions on subsequent valuations in a costly contemplation model," (with Elie Ofek and Ernan Haruvy), *Management Science*, 53(8), 1217-1233, 2007.
7. "Waiting to persuade," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119 (1), 223-249, 2004.
8. "The core is manipulable via segmentation," (with Murat Sertel), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 118 (1), 103-117, 2004.
9. "Bargaining without a common prior – An immediate agreement theorem," *Econometrica*, Vol. 71 (3), 793-811, 2003.
10. "Walrasian bargaining," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 45 (2), 465-487, 2003. [The special issue in memory of Robert Rosenthal]
11. "The impossibility of a Walrasian bargaining solution," (with Murat Sertel), in: Koray, S. and M.R. Sertel (editor): *Advances in Economic Design*, Springer-Verlag: Berlin, 175-182, 2003.
12. "Bargaining over risky assets," *Contributions to Theoretical Economics* 2 (1), Article 1. (<http://www.bepress.com/bejte/contributions/vol2/iss1/art1>)  
Reprinted in Holmstrom, B. P. Milgrom, and A. Roth (editors): *Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson*, BE Press, 2002.
13. "Double-edged population monotonicity of Walrasian equilibrium – A note on the nature of competition," (with Murat Sertel), *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 37(3), 1999.  
Reprinted in Walker, Donald A., ed. *The Legacy of Leon Walras*. London: Edward Elgar, 2001.
14. "The Lindahl solution with changing population and resources," (with Murat Sertel), *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 35(2), 1998.

## Working Papers

15. "Public Disagreement," (with Rajiv Sethi), February 2009.
16. "Nash meets Rubinstein in final offer arbitration," October 2007.
17. "Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games," (with Jonathan Weinstein).
18. "Fragility of Asymptotic Agreement under Bayesian Learning," (with Daron Acemoglu and Victor Chernozhukov).

19. “Learning and disagreement in an uncertain world” (with Daron Acemoglu and Victor Chernozhukov), September 2006.
20. “Durability of bargaining power, Learning, and Deadline effect,” (with Alp Simsek) January 2007.
21. “Optimism, deadline effect, and stochastic deadlines”, August 2004.
22. “Evolution of perceptions and play,” (with Daron Acemoglu), June 2001.
23. “Membership in two custom unions,” (with Murat Sertel), 1994.
24. “Manipulation of allocation rules with respect to technology,” M.A. Thesis.

## **Work in Progress**

25. “Role of optimism and asymmetric information in bilateral bargaining,” (with Nageeb Ali), work in progress.
26. “Cournot foundations of competitive equilibrium – or lack thereof,” (with Jonathan Weinstein), work in progress.

## **Professional Activities**

Foreign Editor: *Review of Economic Studies* (2006 – present)

Associate editor: *Theoretical Economics* (2008-present) *BEPress Theoretical Economics* (2006 – present), *Review of Economic Design* (2000-present),

Member of Organization Committee: SED2002, SED 2004, SED 2006, and TARK XI.

Referee: American Economic Review, Econometrica, European Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of European Economic Association, Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Rand Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Design, Review of Economic Studies, Theoretical Economics, Theoretical Economics journals of BE press; also for National Science Foundation and Israeli Science Foundation.

## **Advisees**

Jonathan Weinstein (Principal Advisor, now at Northwestern University)

Casey Rothschild (Principal Advisor, now at Middlebury College)

Kenichi Amaya (now at Kagawa University, Japan)

Sylvain Chassang (now at Princeton University)

Daniel Gottlieb (Principal Advisor)

Arthur Campbell