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**DOCTORAL STUDIES:**     Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)  
PhD, Economics, June 2006  
DISSERTATION: "Essays on the Economics of Law, Crime, and Discrimination"

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES

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**PRIOR EDUCATION**     Stanford University, M.S. in Physics, 2000  
Harvard College, A.B. in Physics *magna cum laude*, 1998

**CITIZENSHIP**     US

**RESEARCH & TEACHING FIELDS**     Primary Fields: Law and Economics, Labor Economics  
Secondary Fields: Public Finance, Experimental Economics, Behavioral Finance

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

Analytical Methods in Law (graduate, University of Chicago Law School), developed and taught new course	Spring 2008, Winter 2007
Experimental and Behavioral Economics (graduate, MIT 14.160), Teaching Assistant to Professor Ernst Fehr	Fall 2004, Fall 2003
Intermediate Macroeconomics (undergraduate, MIT course 14.05), Teaching Assistant to Peter Temin	Fall 2004
Electricity and Magnetism; Optics; Modern Physics (undergraduate, Stanford University), Teaching Assistant	Fall, Spring, Winter 2000

<b>RELEVANT POSITIONS</b>	John M. Olin Fellow in Law and Economics and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School	2006 – 2008
	Research Assistant to Professor Sendhil Mullainathan, MIT	2001 – 2003
	Research Assistant to Professor Randy Cohen, Harvard Business School	2001 – 2002
	Graduate research in particle astrophysics with Professor Blas Cabrera, Stanford University	1999 – 2001
	Quantitative Analyst and Trader, D.E. Shaw and Co., New York, NY	1998 – 1999
<b>FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS</b>	Ronald H. Coase Prize for Outstanding Paper in Law and Economics, 2007 George and Obie Schultz Fund Grant, 2005 MIT Graduate Fellowship, 2002 – 2006 Teagle Graduate Fellowship, 2001 – 2004 Russell Sage Foundation Fellowship, Summer Institute on Behavioral Economics, 2002 Stanford Graduate Fellowship, 1999 – 2000 Harvard College Scholarship, 1994 – 1998 Robert Byrd Scholarship, 1994 – 1998 National Plasma Physics Fellowship, 1996	
<b>PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES</b>	Referee for <i>American Law and Economics Review</i> , <i>Journal of Law and Economics</i> , <i>Journal of Legal Studies</i> , <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , <i>Review of Economics and Statistics</i>	
<b>INVITED PRESENTATIONS</b>	2007: Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Conference Conference on Empirical Legal Studies University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Applied Microeconomics Seminar Northwestern University, School of Law NBER Crime Working Group Meeting American Law and Economics Association Conference Criminology and Economics Summer Workshop, Wye Rive Plantation, MD University of Zurich, Economics Seminar European University Institute, Economics Seminar University of Chicago Law School University of Chicago Graduate School of Business 2006: Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Criminology and Economics Summer Workshop Harvard Law, Economics, and Organizations Seminar Harvard Law and Economics Seminar 2005: MIT Labor Economics Seminar NBER Summer Institute (Law and Economics Workshop)	

**RESEARCH  
PAPERS:**

**“Understanding High Skill Worker Productivity using Random Case Assignment in a Public Defender’s Office”** (with Albert Yoon) (**Job Market Paper**)

Measuring high skill worker productivity presents several challenges. High skill workers almost always select their tasks, and unobserved variation across tasks introduces estimation bias. In addition, output for high skill workers is difficult to measure. We exploit a natural experiment where cases are randomly assigned to attorneys within a public defender office to address the selection problem; the random assignment ensures that unobservables have the same distribution across attorneys. Using this data, we are able to investigate the efficiency of the labor market for attorneys, theories of human capital accumulation, and labor market discrimination. Despite a relatively flat wage distribution within cohorts, we find substantial heterogeneity in attorney productivity, as measured by case outcomes. A defendant assigned to a public defender at the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile of the productivity distribution has an expected sentence length 5.3 months (74% of the mean) longer than the defendant assigned to the public defender at the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile. Adding attorney fixed effects to a regression of sentence length on case and defendant characteristics doubles the explanatory power. While we do not find any impact of gender or law school quality, Hispanic attorneys in our data set have significantly higher productivity than non-Hispanic attorneys, as do attorneys with greater tenure. These findings suggest that there may be some discrimination in the labor market, and that the positive correlation of wages and tenure is due at least in part to human capital accumulation.

**“More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration using Sentencing Enhancements”**

Increasing criminal sanctions may reduce crime through two primary mechanisms: deterrence and incapacitation. Disentangling their effects is crucial, since each mechanism has different implications for optimal policy setting. I use the introduction of state add-on gun laws, which enhance sentences for defendants possessing a firearm in the commission of a felony, to isolate the deterrent effect of incarceration. Defendants subject to add-ons would be incarcerated in the absence of the law change, so any short-term impact on crime can be attributed solely to deterrence. Using cross-state variation in the timing of law passage dates, I find that the average add-on gun law results in a roughly 5 percent decline in gun robberies within the first three years of passage. This result is robust to a number of specification tests and does not appear to be associated with large spillovers to other types of crime.

**“Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?”**(with Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan)

Are minorities treated differently by the legal system? Systematic racial differences in case characteristics, many unobservable, make this a difficult question to answer directly. In this paper, we estimate whether judges differ from each other in how they sentence minorities, avoiding potential bias from unobservable case characteristics by exploiting the random assignment of cases to judges. We measure the between-judge variation in the difference in incarceration rates and sentence lengths between African-American and White defendants. We perform a Monte Carlo simulation in order to explicitly construct the appropriate counterfactual, where race does not influence judicial sentencing. In our data set, which includes felony cases from Cook County, Illinois, we find statistically significant between-judge variation in incarceration rates, although not in sentence lengths.

**“Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the Philadelphia Bail Experiment”** (with Chris Rohlfs) (under review at the *American Economic Review*)

This paper performs a cost-benefit analysis to determine socially optimal bail levels that balance the costs to defendants against the costs to other members of society. We consider jailing costs, the cost of lost freedom to incarcerated defendants, and the social costs of flight and new crimes committed by released defendants. Using data from a randomized experiment, we estimate the effects of bail amounts on the fraction of defendants posting bail, fleeing, and committing crimes during pre-trial release. We are also able to estimate defendants’ subjective values of freedom by using data on their bail posting decisions. We find that the typical defendant in our sample would be willing to pay roughly \$1,000 for 90 days of freedom. Further, judges in our study set bail amounts close to optimum levels even in the absence of bail guidelines.

**RESEARCH IN “Virtual Worlds and Real Economics”**

**PROGRESS:**

Virtual worlds or massively multiplayer online games provide an opportunity for a new methodology of economic research. These games attract tens of millions of regular users and generate billions of dollars in revenues. In addition, they have features that mimic the real world in important ways, such as government control of the money supply and taxation, floating exchange rates, and rudimentary legal systems. This paper sets the groundwork for a series of papers seeking to answer real-world economic questions through research in virtual worlds. In order to establish the external validity of virtual world research, I perform a series of standard economic experiments in the virtual world, Second Life. I run the Ultimatum Game, the Trust Game, and the Monty Hall problem on avatars recruited in the game. I find that individual behavior in these games is indistinguishable from that found in real-world experiments. Additionally, demographic data collected from subjects indicates that this is one of the most diverse subject pools in an economic experiment according to several measures.

**“Experimental Macroeconomics in a Virtual World”**

Macroeconomic theories are difficult to test explicitly due to the difficulty in observing or constructing counterfactuals. Detailed data on a macroeconomy and natural or controlled policy experiments are required. A unique aspect of virtual worlds is that they possess both qualities: complete observability of all transactions as well as the potential to manipulate economic rules such as monetary policy and tax policy. Using a unique transaction-level data set from the virtual world Second Life, I am able to perform and evaluate a series of macroeconomic experiments that would be impossible in the real world. Experimental manipulations include altering both monetary policy and tax policy at the economy-wide level. This allows for a variety of experimental tests of macroeconomic predictions, including those pertaining to money demand, Taylor rules for interest rate policy, and taxation.

**“A Virtual Labor Market Experiment”** (with Alain Cohn and Ernst Fehr )

We construct a factory and employ workers in a virtual world in order to test several theories of labor and behavioral economics, including gift-exchange and efficiency wage theories. The virtual world environment allows for an ongoing labor relationship with full-observability at a cost substantially below that in the real world.

**“A Market for Justice”** (with Daniel Chen)

We empirically examine the impact of a more liberalized litigation funding scheme than currently exists in the United States. Two recent innovations in Australia are considered: the ability to trade legal claims and the ability for law firms to go public. We analyze data from Australian courts to determine the impact of litigation trading on settlement rates and amounts, time to settlement, volume of litigation, fees, establishment of precedent, and development of law. Using this data we may test several potential theories of the impact of litigation trading. We can then use these empirical findings to inform a theory of the impact of allowing publicly traded law firms.

**“When Docs Snooze, Do You Lose? Medical Resident Work Hours and Patient Outcomes”**

In 2003, a national 80-hour weekly work limit was imposed on medical residents for the first time. The frequently stated motives were to improve patient outcomes and resident effectiveness, but little is known about how to optimally balance the tradeoff between resident fatigue and patient handoffs. This study makes use of a natural experiment in which New York State imposed a similar work hour limit in 1989. Using a difference-in-difference and triple differences methodology with CMS data, I estimate that the New York rule change decreased 180-day mortality rates by 6-11%. I further analyze preliminary data from the 2003 rule change to investigate whether the results generalize to a national sample.