Job Market Paper

Allies and Adversaries: The Roles of Appointees in Administrative Policymaking in a Separation of Powers System (Job Market Paper)
In a system of divided power, public sector agencies are an important front in the day-to-day battle for political supremacy between the executive and the legislature. The executive’s key agents in this conflict are his appointees, who are observed playing two broad roles: allies, where they work to help Congress implement policy and adversaries, where they fight with Congress to shift policy strongly in the executive’s direction. This paper studies how these two roles arise and what implications they have for the interaction of Congress and the executive in administrative policymaking. Thereby, it highlights how intrinsically motivated bureaucrats combined with hierarchical control affect the ability of the political principals to control the execution of policy. Furthermore, I explore how this interaction shifts under alternative institutional forms, and how it leads appointees to “marry the natives.'’ The model makes several predictions concerning Congressional oversight of bureaucratic agencies. These predictions are broadly supported by an empirical analysis of audit reports released by the Government Accountability Office.

 

Please see my personal web site (left) for data and work in progress.